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FAITH IN THE RULE OF LAW*
MARC

0. DEGIROLAMIt

Our impulsive belief is here always what sets up the original
body of truth, and our articulately verbalized philosophy is but
its showy translation into formulas. The unreasoned and
immediate assurance is the deep thing in us, the reasoned
argument is but a surface exhibition.1
INTRODUCTION

consequentialist,
all but the most unflinching
For
"instrumentalism" tends to draw mixed reviews. So it does from
Brian Tamanaha. His book, Law as a Means to an End: Threat

to the Rule of Law, 2 documents with measured diffidence the
ascendancy and current reign of "legal instrumentalism," so
entrenched an understanding of law that it is "taken for granted
3
in the United States, almost a part of the air we breathe."
Professor Tamanaha shows that in our legal theorizing, our
approaches to legal education, our understanding of legal
practice, and our perception of judges, legislators, and legal
administrators, law is widely believed to be "an empty vessel"
Often,
that is "open with respect to content and ends." 4
* This is an essay on Brian Z. Tamanaha's Law as a Means to an End: Threat to
the Rule of Law. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE
RULE OF LAW (2006) [hereinafter TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END].
t Associate-in-Law and J.S.D. Candidate, Columbia Law School; LL.M.,
Columbia Law School; J.D., Boston University School of Law; M.A., Harvard
University. I am grateful to Brian Tamanaha for his comments and encouragement.
Thanks also to Robert Araujo, S.J., Mark Barenberg, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Gur
Bligh, Anthony Colangelo, Michael Dorf, Elizabeth Emens, Rick Garnett, Kent
Greenawalt, Philip Hamburger, Haider Hamoudi, Paul Horwitz, Steve Smith,
Carolijn Terwindt, and the Associates-in-Law at Columbia Law School for discussion
and comments on prior drafts.
1 WILLIAM JAMES, The Varieties of Religious Experience, in WILLIAM JAMES:
SELECTED WRITINGS 23, 96 (Robert Coles ed., Book-of-the-Month Club 1997) (1902)
[hereinafter JAMES, The Varieties of Religious Experience].
2 TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note *.
3 Id. at 1.
4 Id. at 1, 228; see also Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage:
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Tamanaha seems to make the stronger claim that noninstrumental views of law strike our modern sensibilities as
unreasonable (or naive or faintly ridiculous).
Should this be of any concern? While Tamanaha ostensibly
intends this book as a warning against the peril that creeping
legal instrumentalism poses for the rule of law, his criticism is
tempered. On the one hand, he believes that we have already
traveled a fair distance toward a purely instrumental view of law
and that "intellectual developments and the logic of the situation
portend a worsening ... nightmarish scenario." 5 Despite some
sanguine comments about the power of "human ingenuity" to
stem the instrumentalist tide, he aims to offer a "diagnosis of our
worrisome time."6 On the other hand, he cautions the reader not
to take his admonitions categorically: Instrumental views of law
are often sound, and "[miore to the point, . . . here to stay"-a
fixture of the "modern condition." 7 Non-instrumental conceptions
of law trade on "large mythical components" that are "patently
implausible" today.8 Notwithstanding the critical thrust of the
book, Tamanaha concludes on an equivocal note, reaffirming his
skepticism about non-instrumental theories and opting for
circumspection, if not hopefulness, about the future trajectory of
legal instrumentalism.9
This tension runs throughout and is understandable; after
all, one comes across as either unprincipled or insufferably out of
touch by weighing in too heavily on either side. But it often
leaves the reader wondering what Tamanaha is about in
As a work tracing the development of legal
this book.
Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated
Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 167 (2006) [hereinafter Solum, The Supreme Court

in Bondage] (defining legal instrumentalism to mean, "roughly .... that the outputs
of legal decision-making processes (paradigmatically, appellate adjudication) are,
and should be, determined by extralegal considerations-that is by (extralegal)
considerations of policy or principle").
5 TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note *, at 2.
6 Id. at 2, 8. Tamanaha's confidence in "human ingenuity" is somewhat at odds
with his own assessment, offered only a page later, of the shortcomings of the legal
realists: "Their intention was to improve the functioning of the legal system, not to
undermine it. In hindsight, their main failing was perhaps excessive optimism
(Holmes aside) about the human capacity to strive for and achieve the greater good."
Id. at 2-4.
7 Id. at 6.

8 Id. at 4; see also id. at 132 ("It is late in the day of the exhausted skeptical
modern age for constructing a plausible, functional non-instrumental view of law.").
9 See id. at 246-50.
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instrumentalism in the United States over the past two centuries
in a spare 211 pages, the book is readable, nuanced, and
persuasive. But the book's remaining thirty-nine pages are less
effective in explaining why Tamanaha seems so fretful about the
rule of law or what accounts for the seemingly ineliminable
impulse to affirm a non-instrumentalist view in the face of the
contrary march of history.
This Essay speculates about an answer to these questions. It
argues that one source of resistance to the inexorable progress of
legal instrumentalism, tacitly suggested by Tamanaha, lies in
the belief that the rules that guide our lives deserve our
allegiance because they represent a structure of meaning that
transcends our own finitude.
Our opposition to legal
instrumentalism reflects faith in the rule of law, the belief that
the law bestows worth and possibility to its adherents beyond
their historical context. Faith in the rule of law exists outside of
what Mircea Eliade has called "profane" time: the "evanescent
duration" of time linked to an individual's own life.10 Whether
the law in fact possesses these spiritual dimensions is
unknowable, so there is no way to test this faith. But the value
of faith in the rule of law lies in enabling the believer to affirm an
ineffable commitment to the law when rational grounds, though
often available, are insufficiently powerful to sustain it.
This Essay uses Tamanaha's excellent discussion of the rise
of legal instrumentalism as well as his earlier treatment of the
rule of law11 as a framework for examining the nature and
strength of belief in the rule of law. It explains the significance
of what Tamanaha repeatedly emphasizes is the crucial dangerour inability to believe that the law is anything but an
instrument-by reinterpreting it as loss of faith in the rule of
law. The Essay concludes by considering briefly whether there is
inherent value in faith in the rule of law and what that value
might be.

10 MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION

104 (Willard R. Trask trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1959) (1957) [hereinafter
ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE].
11 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY

(2004) [hereinafter TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW]. Many of Tamanaha's claims
in Law as a Means to an End grow out of his extended discussion of the rule of law in

On the Rule of Law.
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THE NATURE AND STRENGTH OF BELIEF
IN THE RULE OF LAW

It is notoriously difficult to define the rule of law, so much so
that
some
have
characterized
it
as
a
"deeply
ambiguous,... contested concept," 12 or even an "essentially
contested conceptf"-a concept that is "present to us only in the
form of contestation about what the ideal really is."13 Others
have made like claims that the rule of law integrates different
14
inessential "strands" that are "interwoven."
In this vein, Tamanaha offers three plausible rule of law
ideals: formal legality; restraint of government; and "the rule of
law, not individuals." 15 These obviously are not the only ideals
that have ever been associated with the rule of law; if Waldron is
correct about the rule of law's essential contestability, it could
not be otherwise. Thus, this Essay, following the emphasis in
Tamanaha's discussion, does not examine rule of law models that
depend on thick substantive ideals such as human equality,
autonomy, or non-discrimination. Still, considering the rule of
law through the prism of Tamanaha's three ideals sheds
sufficient light to assess the nature and vitality of the
commitment to some of the major ideas associated with the rule
of law.

12

Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781,

791 (1989).
13 Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in
Florida)?,21 L. & PHIL. 137, 151 (2002).
14 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997).
15 TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 114-26. Tamanaha calls
them "three familiar themes that run through the rule of law tradition." One often
sees a binary conceptual division, for example, between a "modest" version and a
"more lofty ideal," GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 11
(1996), or, as Tamanaha himself elsewhere divides it, between "formal" and
"substantive versions," which he then divides further into three sub-categories for
each division. See TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 91; see also
N.W. Barber, Must Legalistic Conceptions of the Rule of Law Have a Social
Dimension?, 17 RATIO JURIS 474, 475 (2004) (dividing the rule of law into "legalistic"
and "non-legalistic" categories); Radin, supra note 12, at 783-84 (noting that there
are two contested views of the rule of law, "instrumental" and "substantive"). A.V.
Dicey's famous version has three elements which reflect most of Tamanaha's
themes. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 187-96, 202 (10th ed. 1959) (1885).
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A.

Formal Legality
Stripped to its core, the rule of law is composed of several
procedural ideals. These usually include generality, equality of
application, predictability (if not certainty), consistency, and
prospectivity. 16 Few theorists refuse to ascribe to it at least this
minimum content. 17 The question then arises: What is the
nature and strength of our belief in the rule of law thus
understood?"'
One possibility is that these formal qualities are inextricably
intertwined with certain liberal democratic values-liberty, for
example. Put simply, the argument is that to believe in one is to
believe in them all. But that claim, as Tamanaha repeatedly
suggests, is false. Formal legality, or what he also calls "legal
liberty,"1 9 stands in an asymmetrical relationship to other liberal
democratic commitments. "Political liberty," or the democratic
creation of laws, and "personal liberty," or restraint on the
government's interference with a zone of personal autonomy, for
example, often depend upon legal liberty, but the reverse is not
necessarily true. 20 Legal regimes with unjust, authoritarian, and
repressive laws often can affirm formal legality. 21 Still, it is well
to recall H. L. A. Hart's observation that "though the most odious
laws may be justly applied, we have, in the bare notion of
applying a general rule of law, the germ at least of justice." 22
Consistent norm application is valuable even in the face of laws
that are less than fully just. 23 But though consistency is an
16 See, e.g., TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 119; see also
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (rev. ed. 1969); Lawrence B. Solum,
Public Legal Reason, 92 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1476 (2006) (describing the "value of a

stable foundation for the law" as "reflected in the great value placed on the rule of
law and the associated values of predictability, stability, and certainty").
17 See, e.g., TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 91-93. In these
pages, Tamanaha effectively criticizes as empty the notion of the rule of law as
merely "rule by law." Id.
18 I assume in this Essay the perspective of a citizen of a liberal democratic
state.
19 See id. at 34-35 (describing "legal liberty," or "the freedom to do whatever the
laws do not explicitly proscribe," as "the dominant theoretical understanding of the
rule of law in modern liberal democracies").
20 See id. at 37.
21 See id. at 37, 120 ("One limitation of the rule of law understood in these
[formalist] terms is that it is compatible with a regime of laws with inequitable or
evil content.").
22 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 206 (2d ed. 1994).
23 See Kent Greenawalt, "PrescriptiveEquality" Two Steps Forward, 110 HARV.
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important component of justice, "justice" here refers merely to a
kind of even application. 24 And the cost of consistent application
of substantively unjust laws may be considerable:
While a
repressive state that commits to formal legality enables its
subjects to organize their affairs predictably, formal legality may
legitimate the state's iniquities and render its oppression more
25
efficient.
A second response might be that we have reason to affirm
legal liberty because political and personal liberty, borrowing
Tamanaha's locution, both depend on legal liberty for their
fullest expression. Thus, we must affirm legal liberty for, as it
were, overtly "instrumental" reasons 26-because those virtues
often secure what we really value, liberal democracy and
individual rights. 27
This response, however, overlooks the
common case of conflict between legal liberty and the other
liberties. 28 The champion of personal liberty may often damage
her cause by affirming legal liberty. 29 Behind the tension
between legal and personal liberty stands another between the
L. REV. 1265, 1268 (1997) [hereinafter Greenawalt, "Prescriptive Equality']
("[G]iving a form of treatment to one equal is a reason to give the same treatment to
another equal.").
24 Professor Leslie Green notes:
Equality is an allocative principle, and the steadfast treatment of like cases
alike under such a principle is therefore a kind of justice, namely, formal
justice. Naturally, that doesn't establish anything about the relationship
between law and substantive justice-it doesn't say anything about the
justice of the laws themselves-but it does say something about the justice
of applying the laws whatever they may be.
Leslie Green, The Germ of Justice 16-17 (Nov. 2005) (unpublished manuscript on
file with the author), http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ilp/2006papers/
green-germofjustice.pdf. Professor Green, however, argues that "formal justice" is
not a distinct category of justice at all and that what is at stake in the allocative
"germ of justice" is in reality merely the "form of justice." See id. at 17-19. I thank
Gur Bligh for calling this essay to my attention.
25 TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 120.
26 See Radin, supra note 12, at 784-87 (arguing that the value in formal legality
lies in the fact that rule of law ideals such as generality and consistency are
"essential for the efficacy of any system of legal rules").
27 There might of course be other, or different, substantive values. The idea is to
explore the extent to which formal legality might be supported as instrumentally
useful in achieving other social purposes. See TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN
END, supra note *, at 71, for an argument that the legal realists would have
supported formal legality for instrumental reasons.
28 See TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 36-38.
29 Late nineteenth century contract law, for example, witnessed a tension
between legal and personal liberty. See MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 36, 112 (1992).
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permanence of legal rules and the development of law to account
for social change. 30 While some stability in the law is necessary,
no one believes that a legal system should be frozen in amber for
eternity. 31 Legal change is valuable and everyone has reasons,
compelling in their eyes, for seeking to weaken, expand, or
modify the scope of formal legality. Litigants (and their lawyers),
of course, have no obligation to refrain from making claims
inconsistent with formal legality. But the question here is not
about obligation, but the nature and strength of the commitment
to formal legality. 32 The impulse toward legal change suggests
that a crucial source of destabilizing pressure on the commitment
to formal legality comes from litigants themselves, the agents of
legal change.
A third and somewhat related possibility is that while I
might recognize that adherence to formal legality in a particular
case might not be in my self-interest, it is better for the greater
number of people or "society as a whole" if I hew to it
nevertheless. Again, the issue is not my obligation to uphold
formal legality (assuming I am not a government official) but
about how best to describe the nature and strength of my belief
in this aspect of the rule of law. The trouble with this response is
that it assumes a substantive commitment to support my belief
in the rule of law whose basis derives from something other than
formal legality. So that if I judge that following a rule does not
advance the public good, my commitment to formal legality may
be destabilized.
The essential difficulty for formal legality, therefore, is that
if there are insufficiently powerful independent reasons to affirm
30 See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 542 (1988) ("Because
rule-bound decisionmaking is inherently stabilizing, it is inherently conservative, in

the nonpolitical sense of the word. By limiting the ability of decisionmakers to
consider every factor relevant to an event, rules make it more difficult to adapt to a
changing future.").
31 See Fallon, supra note 14, at 30 ("It is hard to imagine anyone insisting that
rules, regardless of either their origin or their content, are both necessary and
sufficient for the Rule of Law.").
32 See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Law and the Exemption Strategy 12
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). Compliance with legal rules may
indicate some level of belief in the rule of law, but the fact that someone "follows the
rules" may simply betoken an instrumental commitment. See KENT GREENAWALT,
LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 185 (1992) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY]
("Citizens may consider compliance with rules from a prudential perspective, what is
in their own long-term interest, or from a moral perspective, what should they do
overall.").
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it-that is, reasons that have their own compelling force
whatever other commitments vie against it-then commitment to
the rule of law is often in jeopardy when measured against our
instrumental interests. The reasons for belief in formal legality
must be sufficiently compelling to overcome whatever
instrumental interest opposes them. There will, of course, be
situations in which our belief in formal legality is strong enough
to overcome an opposing instrumental interest. When the
reasons for commitment to that interest are weak, belief in
formal legality "pulls against" the interest and may be
33
sufficiently powerful to overcome it.
But the allegiance to
formal legality is often comparatively weak when measured
against the welter of forces opposing it. Moreover, from a
systemic vantage point,3 4 since consistency and generality are
themselves virtues of formal legality, the rule of law suffers as a
whole each time someone decides that she is more committed to
her own ends than to an ideal with unclear instrumental
benefits. If two outcomes may be given "a logical form," 35 but one
advances my ends while the other is more congruous with formal
legality, and I lack a compelling reason to choose the latter, the
prospects for formal legality appear in doubt.
The usual response to these points, suffused as they are with
the somewhat musty whiff of the indeterminacy debate of the
last century, often focuses on the role of judges. Many have
persuasively argued that the judiciary confronts "hard" cases
rarely and that most are relatively determinate and present few
occasions to deviate from formal legality, especially for judges
who are "faithful" to the rule of law.3 6 Lawyers know which
arguments can be made to courts with some modicum of
plausibility, and the fact that most decisions are not appealed
33 See Greenawalt, "PrescriptiveEquality," supra note 23, at 1270-71. Similarly,
if the instrumental interest is compatible with formal legality, then the belief in
formal legality may "reinforce[]" the commitment to the instrumental interest. See
id.at 1270.
34 See Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage, supra note 4, at 181 ("The
natural domain of decision for the choice between instrumentalism and formalism
extends across the entire practice of law ....[We are choosing a practice to apply to
a whole domain.").
35 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466
(1897).
36 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY, supra note 32, at 38-39;
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: CritiquingCritical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462, 494-95 (1987).
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(and that those that are often yield unanimous decisions) 3 7 is
some evidence that while legal doctrine may "underdetermine"
38
outcomes, it is not radically indeterminate.
To be sure, judges play an important role in shaping the law.
But other actors must be considered as well because the
dynamism of law in democratic states renders belief in formal
legality increasingly fragile. 39 While lawyers and judges may
know by a kind of acculturative tradition when a brief or an
opinion "will not write,"40 most people are not judges or lawyers.
What they usually want from their interactions with the legal
system is instrumental success. Lawyers, of course, want success
as well, but that desire may to some degree be channeled through
their professional conditioning, a kind of practical knowledge
that includes knowing how to be a persuasive advocate while
operating within the side-constraints of formal legality. 4' Nonlawyers have no such conditioning. Similarly, while it is true
that a lawyer may predict when a client's wishes fall too far
outside the range of outcomes that a court is likely to embrace,
the lawyer always has powerful incentives to seek to expand that
range. 42 In other words, when formal legality gives way to
change in the law it is usually the client's interest, 43 not the
judge's, that will have been the agent of the change, and the
lawyer that will have been its instrument. When Tamanaha
writes that "situations initially thought to involve an easy case
could be transformed into a problematic one, with sufficient
37 GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY, supra note 32, at 38-39.
3s See Solum, supra note 36, at 494-95 (arguing that although the outcome of
litigation is not, in all but the "easiest" cases, "rule-bound," it is "rule-guided").
39 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can
Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1294
(2005) ("Pluralist democracy is dynamic and fragile. It is dynamic because the
nature, composition, and balance of politically relevant groups shift over time. It is
fragile because it depends on the commitment of all politically relevant groups to its
processes." (emphasis added)). On legal scholars' preoccupation with the relationship
of the judiciary to the rule of law, sometimes to the exclusion of other relevant
groups, see generally Stephen Macedo, The Rule of Law, Justice, and the Politics of
Moderation, in THE RULE OF LAW 148, 160 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
40 See TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 89.
41 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 109-62 (1993).
42 The "frivolous legal argument" is the usual example. See Jack M. Balkin,
Idolatry and Faith: The Jurisprudence of Sanford Levinson, 38 TULSA L. REV. 553,
566-67 (2003).
43 In this context, the "client" includes anyone-whether a public or private
actor-who wishes to accomplish some end that requires the use of the state's legal
machinery.
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motivation and skill exercised by lawyers or judges who wished
to obtain a different outcome," 44 he gestures toward a crucial
difficulty for commitment to the rule of law but overemphasizes
45
the role of the judge. Those who are not "law-conditioned" that is, most people-may not feel a sufficiently strong allegiance
to formal legality to overcome the commitment to their actual
interests and ambitions.
In fact, many of the contemporary examples of legal
instrumentalism that Tamanaha deplores-the influence of
lobbyists on lawmakers,4 6 the pitched ideological battles over the
appointment of judges, 47 the Enron scandal, 48 the stultifying
conditions in which many young lawyers work, 49 and the recent
attempt by the federal government to justify torture5 0-are
exemplars of the clash between belief in the rule of law and the
instrumental interests of non-lawyers. 51 Even the explosion of
"cause litigation," which fuses the role of client and attorney,
bespeaks the decay of belief in the law-conditioned professional's
formal legality. Measured against the virtues of formal legality,
the "cause lawyer's" interests seem quite compelling. Tamanaha
criticizes Lambda Legal, for example, not because it aims to
"vindicate public norms" but because it "ha[s] not fully
articulated the sense in which [its] activities indeed advance the
public interest, taking seriously and responding to the views of
the many people who disagree." 52 But if it is often doubtful that
formal legality can do the work that Tamanaha demands of it,
then some other rule of law ideal must be grounding this
criticism.

TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 87.
45 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 19 (1960). Llewellyn
44

describes the "law-conditioned" rather lyrically as those who come to "think like
lawyers, not like laymen" and for whom "[c]ases have authority, dictum can be and
is marked off from holding, strict 'system' is unfamiliar and uncomfortable, [and]
'freedom' is an underlying drumbeat and slogan that informs not merely life but
law." Id.
46 See TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note *, at 190-211.
47 See id. at 172-89.
48 See id. at 146.
49 See id. at 136-38.
50 See id. at 148-49.
51 Naturally, lobbyists, politicians, and businesspeople may also be lawyers. But
success in their respective endeavors depends far less on attention to formal legality
than it does for judges and lawyers.
52 See id. at 170.
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Restraint of Government
The rule of law has often been conceived as limiting
government power. Fear of tyranny is the animating principle.
The solution takes the shape of institutional mechanisms that
allocate and diffuse power-such as the constitutional
vaguer
of powers 53-and
separation
and
enumeration
affirmations that "there [a]re certain things the government or
sovereign c[an]not do," 54 or, as Isaiah Berlin had it in his
celebrated essay, "there must be some frontiers of freedom which
55
nobody should be permitted to cross."
The question here is, again, the nature and power of this
belief. Tamanaha identifies three "pre-modern" manifestations
of it: (1) rulers themselves frequently affirmed their allegiance to
the law through oaths or other public proclamations; (2) it was
"widely understood or assumed"-whether on the basis of
customary, natural, or divine law-that government actors
5 6
operated within universally applicable legal superstructures;
and (3) "as a matter of routine conduct" or "mundane regularized
conformity," those in power understood that they were legally
57
constrained.

B.

53 The fear of the abuse of power, as famously described by Montesquieu,
requires the separation of powers between the legislative and the two "executive"
departments (the executive and the judicial). CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6 (1748), reprinted in 38 GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 68-71 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., Thomas
Nugent & J.V. Prichard trans., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952) ("The political
liberty of the subject is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each person
has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so

constituted as one man need not be afraid of another."); see also THE FEDERALIST
NOS. 10, 51, at 42-43, 268 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan

eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2001) (arguing that since factionalism inheres in human
nature and is one of the "diseases" of government, "[a]mbition must be made to
counteract ambition"); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL
THINKERS 24-25 (Stanley Hoffmann ed., 1998) ("All that was needed for the Rule of
Law in Europe... was a properly equilibrated political system in which power was
checked by power in such a way that neither the violent urges of kings nor the
arbitrariness of legislatures could impinge directly upon the individual in such a
way as to frighten her and make her feel insecure in her daily life.").
54 TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 96; see also TAMANAHA,
LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note *,at 218.

55 ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958), reprinted in LIBERTY 166,
210 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
56 This is not quite how Tamanaha phrases it, but he discusses this "general
understanding" as rooted in divine, natural, or customary law, all of which make
claims about the law's universally binding quality.
57 TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 115-16.

ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 82:573

The first of these manifestations may have roots in premodern social systems but it is alive and well today. Tamanaha
quotes from a motley troupe of political actors, each of whom
publicly praises the restraint of government ideal. 58 While he
acknowledges the need for skepticism about the sincerity of many
of these encomia, he nevertheless is impressed that, at least as a
matter of public form, virtually every contemporary political
figure supports the rule of law. 59 Tamanaha is undoubtedly
correct that the restraint of government ideal carries at least a
basic and possibly universal meaning. Despotic regimes in which
rulers have unbridled discretion to make decisions on a whim
and without any accountability-one thinks, for example, of the
dictatorships of Idi Amin or Saddam Hussein-clearly are
inconsistent with the restraint of government ideal. 60
But
beyond that basic understanding, there are few ascertainable
substantive beliefs in the statements Tamanaha quotes about
which any of the speakers could be sincere. The commitments
behind these expressions are obscure, even as rhetorical devices,
61
and that is what makes them frustratingly superficial.
Tamanaha suggests that the simple fact of affirmation is
meaningful, but if the rhetoric of allegiance has only a minimum
core meaning that can with any confidence be imputed to the
speaker, it is difficult to know exactly what to make of these
proclamations.
The rhetorical vitality of Tamanaha's first pre-modern
manifestation of the restraint of government ideal often depends
58 See id. at 1-2.
59 See id. at 3.
60 See Kent Greenawalt,

The Rule of Law and the Exemption Strategy 4

(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("A regime in which all disputes were
taken before a ruler who dispensed justice according to his sense of the moment
would not satisfy the rule of law.").
61 Well-worn, demagogic political statements such as, "We need to fight for a
better tomorrow for our children!" or "We're winning the war on terror!" are roughly
as substantial as, "Only a government that subjects itself to the rule of law has any
moral right to demand of its citizens obedience to the rule of law." TAMANAHA, ON
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 2 (quoting the President of Zimbabwe, Robert
Mugabe, in a 2002 speech); see also Hendrik Hertzberg, Desolation Rows: The
Execution of Saddam Hussein, NEW YORKER, Jan. 15, 2007, at 21 (reporting that
after the execution of Saddam Hussein, a White House statement noted that the
hanging represented "the Iraqi people's determination to create a society governed
by the rule of law"). Each statement carries a vague meaning-respectively,
something about providing for children's futures, public safety, and restraining
government-but more substantial meanings are difficult to discern.
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on the preexistence of the second manifestation.6 2 A commonly
understood conceptual framework for what an official intends by
pledging allegiance to the rule of law-that the state may never
transgress certain individual rights (Tamanaha's "personal
liberty"), 63 that the customs of the people are inviolable 64 and
restrain the arbitrary exercise of state power, that law is a
"science" founded on certain immutable principles, 65 that the
data of social science have an inherent moral valence to which
law must conform, 66 and so on-represents some set of
substantive commitments against which the sincerity of the
67
rhetoric of rule of law affirmations may be measured.
Tamanaha adequately accounts for the importance of the
second pre-modern manifestation, but he is somewhat dismissive
of the rhetorical power of non-instrumental theories, seeing in
them something more. 68 It should be noted that rhetorical
efficacy alone is no mean feat. Given the social and economic
stresses on them by the mid-nineteenth century, 69 it was an
impressive achievement for non-instrumental theories to

62 See
STEPHEN
M.
FELDMAN,
AMERICAN
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM 78-80 (2000)

LEGAL
THOUGHT
FROM
(describing how in mid-

nineteenth century judicial opinions, principles of natural law "would only rarely be
referred to, [but] they always remained significant as a foundation for the legal
system-a foundation of principles that could fade into the background only because
so many American judges, lawyers, and jurisprudents willingly agreed on and
accepted the idea of broad natural law principles").
63 See TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note *, at 13.
64 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 31-33 (Howe ed., 1963).
65 See TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note *, at 15-16.
66 See HORWITZ, supra note 29, at 210 ("The [twentieth century] turn to social
science was part of this general effort to find alternative forms of legitimation amid
the decline of religious belief and the disintegration of an orthodox Darwinian
paradigm."); see also DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE
SIkCLE) 112 (1997) ("Much in the current state of legal theory in the United States is
explained by the realists' choice to attempt to reground the rules of law in a
combination of fine-grained policy analysis and larger theories of coherence.").
67 This is the case, of course, even if we bracket the question of the truth of the
underlying commitments. For Berlin's statement of this idea, see BERLIN, supra note
55, at 210 ("What these rules or commandments will have in common is that they
are accepted so widely, and are grounded so deeply in the actual nature of men as
they have developed through history, as to be, by now, an essential part of what we
mean by being a normal human being.").
68 See TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note *, at 20 ("As myths
cum ideals ... [non-instrumental theories] extended beyond the realm of rhetoric to
establish standards of accountability and norms that affected the behavior of legal
officials.").
69 See HORWITZ, supra note 29, at 65-108.
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continue to ground the ideal of government restraint in the
popular imagination. But Tamanaha never convincingly makes
the case that non-instrumental theories in this period were more
than rhetorical devices with increasingly diminishing social
relevance. Indeed, the familiar and undeniable story he tells is of
the breakdown of non-instrumental rhetoric. It is the relentless
progression of "restraint of government" from near absolute to
highly contingent ideal-a process of change whose beginning
has been symbolically marked by Holmes's theoretical resting
place in The Path of the Law70 and which continued through the
fact-oriented social insights of the legal realists, 7 1 the successive
jurisprudence of the New Deal, Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist
Courts, the emergence of the welfare state with its comparative
superabundance of legislation and regulation, the "capture" of
regulatory and administrative systems by private interests, and
so on. 72 While it has long been charged with social control, the
state came gradually to be perceived as a crucial agent of social
change as well; if it is true that "[the rule of law] undoubtedly
restrains power, but it also prevents power's benevolent
exercise," 73 then the virtue of restraining the state seemed to
depend heavily on the context in which power was exercised
rather than on any prior idea that the ideal was intrinsically
valuable. With the rapid increase in the number of laws-in
law's domain-came, paradoxically, the diminishment of the rule
of law, as discretion in enforcement assumed ever greater
70 See id. at 142. "If law is merely politics, then the legislature should in fact
decide. If law is merely a battleground over which social interests clash, then the
legislature is the appropriate institution for weighing and measuring competing
interests." Id. (describing this aspect of Holmes's position in The Path of the Law).
71 See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism:Legal Realist Approaches to
the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 380-81 (1990) ("The government was
ultimately responsible for the distribution of power and wealth in society when
actors made use of its rules of contract, property, and tort .... Thus, no articulation
and protection of rights could be politically neutral-any definition of rights
necessarily defined the rights of others. No [legal] regime ...was unregulated or
free of governmental policy or government intervention-there were only different
possible regimes and different choices about which persons to benefit at the expense
of others.").
72 See TAMANAHA, LAW ASA MEANS TO AN END, supra note *,at 60-95, 190-211;
see also Theodore J. Lowi, The Welfare State, the New Regulation, and the Rule of
Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 17, 17-58 (Allan C. Hutchinson &
Patrick Monahan eds., 1987) (arguing that the ideal of government restraint is
absent in the regulatory programs of the 1970s).
73 Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE
L.J. 561, 566 (1977).
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importance. 74
Discretion, of course, is not the same as
delegation.7 5 Yet there is also a sense in which the sheer
expansion of the government's reach is, apart from the question
of discretion, an additional, independent threat to the restraint of
government ideal. And as for the state's power of social control,
it is a mark of the present instability of the restraint of
government ideal that there is a pressing need to explain why
state-sanctioned torture offends the rule of law.76
I do not wish to be misunderstood as arguing that restraint
of government is no longer an ideal to which most people remain
committed. There does exist a core belief that regimes in which
decisions are made capriciously and laws applied unevenly do not
comport with the rule of law. The separation (though less the
enumeration) of powers is still regarded as a necessary feature of
a properly functioning liberal democracy and the judiciary enjoys
considerable independence in evaluating government conduct.
Tamanaha's third "pre-modern" understanding of government
restraint-the recognition that actions too far outside the aegis of
positively authorized "routine conduct" may result in legal
77
sanctions-remains an effective restraint on government actors.
Nevertheless,
that
instrumental
motivation
does
not
fundamentally alter the conclusion that, as with formal legality,
the extent to which government restraint is prized depends upon
the particular end that government action would advance.
C.

"The Rule of Law, Not Individuals"

The last, and perhaps best known, 78 of Tamanaha's rule of
law ideals is also the most elusive. It speaks to the belief that no
one should be "subject to the unpredictable vagaries of other
74 See Fallon, supra note 14, at 3-4 ("[T]wentieth-century legislatures have
vastly expanded the sweep of governmental regulation, and they have frequently
relied on administrative agencies with vague mandates and a mixture of
enforcement, rulemaking, and adjudicative powers ....");David A. Skeel, Jr. &
William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
809,821-23 (2006).
75 See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546
(1985).
76 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudencefor the
White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1739-43 (2005).
77 See TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 117-18.
78 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). "The government of
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men." Id. at 163.
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individuals. '79 The primary difficulty with this ideal has been
well formulated by Margaret Jane Radin:
The point of "the Rule of Law, not of individuals" is that the
rules are supposed to rule. The easiest... way to achieve that
in our historical and philosophical context is to assume that
rules apply to particular cases in an analytical or self-applying
way ....
[But] [o]nce we admit that rules are mutable and inextricable
from material social practice, we will at least experience a
psychological change in the way we perceive our roles as legal
80
actors.
Tamanaha focuses especially on the danger that the rule of
law in this sense may become the rule of judges, but the problem
is even more basic: Tamanaha's ideal of "political liberty," the
freedom of the people to make laws, sits in an uneasy
relationship with the concept of "rule by rules." As Professor
Paul Kahn has argued, it may be that it is an "internal,
structural necessity of the rule of law" to separate the "source of
law" from its "appearance" 8 1-that the person of the sovereign
must always be distinguished from the "permanent sovereign of
the nation."8 2 But, the history traced by Tamanaha puts in
83
serious question the strength of the commitment to this ideal.
79 TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 122.
80

Radin, supra note 12, at 809. Additionally, see Jean Hampton, Democracy

and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 13, 16 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994), for a

description of a crucial feature of Hobbes's "regress argument":
A rule is inherently powerless; it only takes on life if it is interpreted,

applied, and enforced by individuals. That set of human beings that has
final say over what the rules are, how they should be applied, and how they
should be enforced has ultimate control over what these rules actually are.
So human beings control the rules, and not vice versa.
Id.
81 See PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 181 (1997).

See id. at 183.
Professor Kahn's observation that "[w]hen critics of the Court can find no
source of law outside the opinion, they accuse the Justices of putting their own will
in the place of law," id. at 182, squares neatly with Professor Tamanaha's criticism
that the Rehnquist Supreme Court "engaged in an aggressive reinterpretation of the
respective powers of the state and federal governments." TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE
OF LAW, supra note 11, at 125; see also TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END,
supra note *,at 90-96 ("It is as if, owing to the cumulative impact of the Legal
Realists, the 1937 revolution, the Warren Court reforms, the Burger Court
continuation, and the Roe singularity, an essential component of judging on the
Supreme Court snapped, an intangible but no less real sense of self-restraint.").
82
83
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II.

FAITH IN THE RULE OF LAW

There is, therefore, considerable cause for skepticism about
the power of belief in the rule of law as Tamanaha presents it.
But there is one undeveloped yet pervasive theme in the book:
essential
that
the
emphasizes
repeatedly
Tamanaha
instrumentalist danger is that people have lost the ability or will
to believe that law is anything other than a means to an end.
"The fact of [a non-instrumental] belief," he writes, "turned out to
have greater significance than its falsity. '8 4 Or again, as he
discusses contemporary judges:
The threat to the rule of law posed by this complex of ideas
[relating to law's indeterminacy] is not that judges are
incapable of rendering decisions in an objective fashion. Rather,
it cannot be done
the threat is that judges come to believe that
85
or that most fellow judges are not doing it.
Tamanaha's repeated insistence on the importance of belief itself
and the effects of the steady loss of that belief-and not on the
truth or falsity of the belief-is, I suggest, the key to the book.
To understand Tamanaha's argument, a brief excursion is
Two often unstated but critical assumptions
necessary.
underlying the usual discussion of the rule of law must be
probed: (1) the rule of law proceeds from and always depends
upon "reason;" and (2) the rule of law operates within "ordinary
legal time." The Essay, in this section, considers what it would
mean for the rule of law to be in some measure dependent upon
non-rationalistic and extra-ordinary temporal frameworks,
exploring the possibility that belief in the rule of law might
fruitfully be conceived as "faith." We can then understand
Tamanaha's critique of legal instrumentalism by reinterpreting
it as loss of faith in the rule of law.
A.

Reason and the Rule of Law

Arguments connecting the rule of law and reason are
ancient,8 6 and legion. T. R. S. Allen, for example, has written
TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note *, at 19.
at 236. For similar statements, see id. at 35, 142-43, 150, 244, and
TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 119.
86 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
198-200 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., rev. ed. 1976); ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 219-24,
84

85 Id.

226 (T.A. Sinclair trans., rev. ed. 1981) ("Therefore he who asks law to rule is asking
God and intelligence and no others to rule; while he who asks for the rule of a
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that judges are charged to expound the "common good" and to
express "the collective understanding" rationally and impartially
by adhering to the rule of law. 7 While the relationship between
reason and the rule of law has drawn some skepticism, 8 8 it is
undeniable that an important component of belief in the rule of
law depends upon the exercise of reason. The ideals of formal
legality and restraint of government, for example, are at least
Almost
partially justifiable on the basis of reason alone:
everyone understands that equal application of laws is
worthwhile in itself and that an unrestrained government with
unchecked discretion is undesirable.
Nevertheless, even supporters8 9 of the reason/rule of law
nexus must concede that it often applies to a relatively narrow
class of people: those with sufficiently virtuous characters to be
Legal theorists
capable of reasoning to a just outcome. 90
generally have judges in mind for this role and "put enormous
burdens on [judges] in their daily conduct." 9 1 To the extent that
this demanding version of the rule of law is dependent on the
commitment of the citizenry to the rule of law, 92 those whose
powers of reasoning and virtuous dispositions are less developed
will be less capable of reasoning consistently to it. Sometimes,
human being is importing a wild beast too; for desire is like a wild beast, and anger
perverts rulers and the very best of men. Hence law is intelligence without
appetit[e]."); see also SHKLAR, supra note 53, at 22 ("The first of these models [of the
Rule of Law] can be attributed to Aristotle, who presented the Rule of Law as
nothing less than the rule of reason."); Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence,
and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 1033 (2000) ("Aristotle insists on the rule
of law, not of men, on the ground that only governance by reason can be impartial
and even-handed.").
87 See T.R.S. Allen, The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reason: Consent and
Constitutionalism,115 L.Q. REV. 221, 239 (1999).
88 See, e.g., PAUL F. CAMPOS, PIERRE SCHLAG & STEVEN D. SMITH, AGAINST THE
LAW (1996); PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 15 (1998) (noting that

"the reason of law not only underwrites the rule of law but provides a sense of
comfort and control to jurists and citizens alike," but that there is a "moment when
reason is unable to furnish answers in law").
89 E.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70
BROOK L. REV. 475 (2005); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Intelligibility of the Rule of Law,
in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY, supranote 72, at 59, 75.
90 SHKLAR, supra note 53, at 23.

91 Id. ("[T]hose who judge ... must go beyond [their passions] to reason their
way to a logically necessary conclusion. To achieve that they must understand
exactly just how forensic rhetoric and persuasive reasoning work, while their own
ratiocination is free from irrational imperfections. For that a settled ethical
character is as necessary as is intelligence itself.").
92 See Macedo, supra note 39, at 161-62.
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when the rules are clear and their application to a particular
situation is definite, they will be. But often not.
Yet even as to the individuals of excellent character, there
are other reasons for doubt about the extent to which reason can
support commitment to the rule of law. The application of
particularistic reasoning to legal conclusions plays an important
but circumscribed role in explaining why ideals such as
"government restraint" or "the rule of law, not individuals,"
ought to be affirmed in the large by legal decision-makers.
Adjudication is ultimately a matter of deciding between the
claims of litigating parties, not broader questions of principle,
social policy, or justice. 93
The finality of adjudication-its
summary and argument-terminating form-stands in tension
with the aspiration to offer a fully elaborated explanation for a
ruling. Moreover, the various modes of acceptable adjudicative
argumentation-for example, textual or intentional interpretive
techniques, analogies from precedent, institutional and historical
observations-often are incompatible with thoroughly reasoned
argument. 94 H. Jefferson Powell's remark that "[c]ontemporary
American judges do not impose the rule of reason on Caesar, they
are Caesar" 95 exemplifies the modern skepticism about the
relationship between the restraint of government ideal and
reasoned judgment.
But perhaps this is too demanding a rendering of "reason."
It may not be necessary to be wedded to purely syllogistic
reasoning 96 and the unity of the virtues in order to believe that
93 Obviously judging can as a secondary matter implicate these other concerns
but it is not an especially controversial proposition that the judge's core function is
to decide the rights of parties.
94 Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 813-14 (2002). Professor Whittington
points out that the Supreme Court, like most appellate courts, is itself a
majoritarian institution: "Opinions are written and rewritten so as to attract the
support of reluctant colleagues, and negotiations are held, tactics are employed, and
bargains are made as the agenda is set, decisions are made, and opinions are
written." Id. at 817. For federal appellate courts, the restraints imposed by higher
authority frequently stifle what might otherwise be a more developed exercise in
reasoned decision-making.
95 H.

JEFFERSON

POWELL,

THE

MORAL

TRADITION

OF

AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONALISM 11 (1993).
96 None of this is to deny that syllogistic or deductive reasoning continues to
play an important role in structuring legal thought. See NEIL MACCORMICK,
RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING 42 (2005). But

we are interested here not in the formal structure of arguments supporting the rule
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there is a connection between the rule of law and a kind of
stepchild of classical reason-a commitment to principled
consistency, for example. 97 Consistency is itself one of the virtues
of formal legality. And it is certainly true that consistency often
marks an organized, impartial, and fair mind. Yet further
reflection yields the suspicion that even this more modest claim
may be problematic.
Few scholars have expressed greater doubt about the nexus
between reason and constitutional law and theory than Professor
Steven Smith. In The Constitution and the Pride of Reason,98
Smith argues that while the American founders drew on both
classical and enlightenment understandings of "reason" in
creating a highly detailed, legalistic Constitution, the "collapse of
nature," or the widespread rejection over the last two centuries of
belief in a metaphysical reality, has rendered modern
constitutional
discourse
dependent
on
"conventionalist"
reasoning. 99 Smith describes the consequent development of
"regulatory reason," in which the conventions of the community
form the raw material that the legal theorist or judge subjects to
"the discipline of reasoned discourse." Often enough, this means
testing the beliefs for consistency. 100 But because the regulatory
reasoner lacks recourse to any standard other than conventionindeed, because inconsistency is itself sometimes a celebrated
trait of conventional belief systems-the regulatory reasoner
cannot point to any criterion that distinguishes beliefs that are
held on the basis of reason from those that stem from "prejudice"
or blind adherence to "tradition."101 Or, at least, he cannot point
to consistency for this purpose. As a result, almost any belief can
10 2
be characterized as consistent with either reason or prejudice.
of law ideals, but in the connection between "reason" and belief in the rule of law-in
other words, the discovery through "reason" of the rule of law ideals.
97

See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 7-9 (2001) (arguing

that the rule of law produces "principled predictability"); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 249-51 (1977) (suggesting that, at the very least, morality
requires consistent application of moral positions and principles).
98 STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON (1998).

99 Id. at 84-86.
100 Id. at 94-97. "The role of reason is thus to examine existing beliefs to see if

they are in fact based on 'reasons,' rather than on ignorance, prejudice, and
tradition." Id. at 97. Consistency is believed to be an efficacious method of teasing
out this difference.
101 Id. at 107-09.
102

Id. at 110.
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The regulatory reasoner's constitutional discourse collapses into
a kind of sophistry, which, as it degenerates, exhibits the latter's
tendencies toward flattery, ad hominem bullying, and ipse dixit
authoritarianism. 103
In short, the aspiration to persuade by
reason devolves into precisely its opposite.10 4
Professor Smith's project is ambitious and he may overstate
his case. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to accept Smith's
claims in their strongest form in order to draw from them the
milder conclusion that the connection between reason and
Tamanaha's rule of law ideals may sometimes be insufficiently
powerful to explain the commitment necessary for sustaining the
rule of law.
Whether the ideals of formal legality and
government restraint10 5 are affirmed in any particular case will
depend on a wide variety of circumstances. The better exercise of
reason is likely to be one of them insofar as it explains why
everyone has cause to condemn an unrestrained government that
applies laws unpredictably and arbitrarily. But when the ideals
are contested by parties whose opposing interests do not so
clearly offend the rule of law, reason alone is hard-pressed to
explain our belief in the rule of law because (1) we no longer find
persuasive the classical rendering of reason, and, in consequence,
we do not know which manifestations of these two rule of law
ideals are congruous with reason in this strong sense;'0 6 and
Id. at 119-24.
Id. at 123-24. Compare Berlin's elaboration of positive liberty and the
difference between the "empirical" and "real" or "rational" self. BERLIN, supra note
55, at 191-200.
105 The "rule of law, not individuals" requires a separate analysis. See infra
notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
106 Charles Taylor captures this idea in his discussion of the nature of the
prevalent "framework" that structures identity:
This is the [modern] ideal of the disengaged self, capable of objectifying not
only the surrounding world but also his own emotions and inclinations,
fears and compulsions, and achieving thereby a kind of distance and selfpossession which allows him to act "rationally." This last term has been put
in quotes, because obviously its meaning has changed relative to the
Platonic sense. Reason is no longer defined in terms of a vision of order in
the cosmos, but rather is defined procedurally, in terms of instrumental
efficacy, or maximization of the value sought, or self-consistency.
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 21
(1989).
Michael Oakeshott, whose critique of "rationalism" clearly stands behind
Smith's, writes:
One important aspect of the history of the emergence of Rationalism is the
changing connotation of the word "reason." The "reason" to which the
103
104
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(2) the rendering of reason that we do accept, with its emphasis
on exposing inconsistencies in conventional belief, is in difficult
cases unable to distinguish between affirming either of these rule
of law ideals on the basis of reason as opposed to prejudice or
tradition.107 Furthermore, moving to the systemic level, it is
likely true that people affirm, for example, the restraint of
government ideal as a general matter because they "know it to be
true" in some intuitive sense, 10 8 even if they have no consistent
allegiance to it.
But it is then dubious that "reason" is
responsible for that belief. 10 9
There is an additional, exacerbating difficulty. Part of the
reason that the "rule of law, not individuals" ideal is especially
nettlesome is that it can be so readily claimed by both, or all,
sides of a dispute. We can distinguish three categories of ideals:
(1) those that are "present in clear and well-defined form," in

Rationalist appeals is not, for example, the Reason of Hooker, which
belongs still to the tradition of Stoicism and of Aquinas. It is a faculty of
calculation by which men conclude one thing from another and discover fit
means of attaining given ends not themselves subject to the criticism of
reason, a faculty by which a world believed to be a machine could be
disclosed.
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 5, 22-23 n.24 (Liberty Fund 1991) (1962) [hereinafter RATIONALISM].
107 See OAKESHOTT, Rational Conduct, in RATIONALISM, supra note 106, at 99,
114.
108 Some scholars claim that the Warren Court reached the correct result in
Brown and other important civil rights cases in much the same intuitive manner,
but for reasons that in retrospect have seemed unpersuasive. See, e.g., MARK
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

131-33 (1988) ("Earl Warren had humane instincts, not a systematic philosophy.").
For two early statements of "intuitive" adjudication, see Herman Oliphant, A Return
to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 159 (1928) ("With eyes cleared of the old and broad
abstractions which curtain our vision, we come to recognize more and more the
eminent good sense in what courts are wont to do about disputes before
them.... From this viewpoint we see that courts are dominantly coerced, not by the
essays of their predecessors but by a surer thing,-by an intuition of fitness of
solution to problem,-and a renewed confidence in judicial government is
engendered.") (footnote call number omitted), and Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The
Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in JudicialDecision, 14 CORNELL
L.Q. 274 (1929) ("[G]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision
will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major
premise." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. Pac. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
109 Certainly this is not "reason" in the sense that John Stuart Mill, for example,
an avowed critic of intuitionism, intended. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, The
Subjection of Women, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 123-24
(Modern Library 2002).
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which case "controversies tend to center on strategies and
implementation, and the weight that the ideal should have
against other competing values;" 110 (2) those that are contested,
or "deeply" contested, in which case the meaning of the ideal is in
dispute but the rival camps will not be able to claim that the
ideal has no core or essential exemplars and can admit of almost
any rendering;111 and (3) those that are "essentially contested," in
which case the meaning of the ideal is "present to us only in the
form of contestation about what the ideal really is."112 The ideal
of "the rule of law, not individuals" belongs to the third category.
While it is believed to have something vaguely to do with respect
for the law and leeriness of individual power:
[W]e disagree on how this can be done, and whether it can ever
be done completely. We also disagree on the precise nature of
the danger posed by human power in its unmitigated form, and
on the values that would be served by introducing law into the
picture. We disagree about the ailment, the medicine, and the
character of the cure. 113
B.

Time and the Rule of Law
The second tacit assumption
worth exploring
in
reconstructing Tamanaha's "belief' argument involves the
relationship between the rule of law and time. Though the
interactions of law and time have received some limited scholarly
attention, recent writings have generally discussed the question
of law's ability to structure our perceptions and uses of time. 1 4
Scholars therefore have tended to focus on how time can be
manipulated to "serve our interests," whether as the legal
instrumentality of individuals, groups, or institutions."15
110

Waldron, supra note 13, at 151. Professor Waldron cites the principle of

"wealth maximization" as an example in this category. Id.
III I would count the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment," for
example, in this category, as well as the restraint of government rule of law ideal.
112 Waldron, supra note 13, at 151.
113 Id. at 159; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
114 Thus, Professor Todd Rakoff discusses the power of law not only to allocate
one's time to particular activities, but also to synchronize the events and regularize
the rhythms of one's daily existence. TODD D. RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE:
LAW AND THE BALANCE OF LIFE 163-64 (2002). Likewise, in her review of Rakoff's
book, Professor Orly Lobel emphasizes that time is often an instrument of the
powerful to impose legal structures with unevenly distributed benefits and burdens.
Orly Lobel, The Law of Social Time, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 357, 372 (2003) (book review).
115 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 114, at 372 ("Any account of the relation between
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Far less has been written about time's influence on our
perception of law. The kinds of questions suggested by this
relationship might include: In what kind of temporal structure
does law exist? Is that structure best conceived as a linear
progression, a cyclical return, a combination of the two, or
something else? Do different conceptions of time structure and
affect different features of law? Assuming law does exist within
some conception(s) of time, what sorts of practical insights about
our lives "under" the law follow from situating it within one or
another temporal framework?
A full treatment of these
questions would take this Essay too far afield from its immediate
aim, which is to explore how time shapes our understanding of
Tamanaha's three rule of law ideals. My contention here is that
there are two temporal orders within which law1 16 is situated"ordinary" and "transcendent" legal time-and that to believe in
the rule of law is to affirm the existence of transcendent legal
time.
Ordinary legal time includes the finite, generally irreversible
episodes of any person's lifetime as governed by law and the
"inherit[ed] ... dominant temporal culture that stresses the
linear, infinite nature of time."117 More concretely, ordinary legal
time is, first, legal "industrial clock time"11 8 : It is the time
governing one's daily, legal interactions (the time frame in which
a lawyer bills hours, files timely motions, and meets client
deadlines, or in which a non-lawyer appears for depositions,
writes and signs a will, makes contracts and timely performs
obligations, and so on) and the time controlling various sorts of
legal rules, such as the right to a speedy trial, statutes of
limitation, claim and issue preclusion, excusable neglect rules,
law and time must identify the winners and losers of battles over particular
constructions of time."). Another legally constructed account of time appears in
Professor Jed Rubenfeld's discussion of how the "writtenness" of the Constitution
enables "a people [to] achieveD self-government not by conforming governance to the
authoritative democratic will at any given time, but by laying down and holding
itself to its own democratically-authored foundational commitments over
time." JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-

GOVERNMENT 168 (2001).
116 For this purpose, it makes no difference whether we are dealing with
constitutions, statutes, or common law.
117 See Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural
Legitimation of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631, 1642 (1989).
118 See Rebecca R. French, Time in the Law, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 663, 705-07
(2001).
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and the doctrine of laches. 119 This facet of ordinary legal time is
generally irreversible 120 and always finite in that it operates only
during an individual's lifetime. Second, ordinary legal time
consists in the existence and operation of laws before,
throughout, and after an individual's lifetime. In this second
sense, it is the time of the "positive law"-the aggregate of
existing laws that forms part of a state's legal deposit and that is
perceived as an infinite, linear extension or continuity.1 21 It is
"the sum total of all that has been done and not yet undone" in
law.1 22 Ordinary legal time in both of its aspects presupposes an
instrumental orientation. That is, ordinary legal time operates
within the larger domain of personal, social, or political interests.
The first facet of ordinary legal time organizes and limits the
ways in which interests are realized or frustrated. The second
supplies a set of rules for the achievement of ends and the rules
123
can be modified as the ends change.
But the law also possesses a "self-totaliz[ing]" or "mythic
dimension" that exists outside the instrumentalities of ordinary
legal time.1 24 This "transcendent" legal time is cyclical as well as
reversible 125 and constantly reaffirms the "distinctions between
law and interests, the ephemeral and the enduring, the political
and the sacred." 126 In his classic work, The Sacred and the
Profane, the religious historian Mircea Eliade distinguished
119 See id.
120 Cf. id. at 707-08 (describing how legal operations can sometimes expand,
contract, or even reverse ordinary clock time, such as statutes that redefine the
length of one day for the purpose of standardizing service of process requirements).
121 See Greenhouse, supra note 117, at 1642.
122 PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 43 (1999) [hereinafter KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW].
123 Professor Cathleen Kaveny has written that the philosophy of the "billable
hour," for example, is characterized both by "treat[ing] time as instrumentally
valuable, rather than intrinsically valuable" and by "its tendency to create the
illusion of an endless present" in which lawyers see their "entire lives as nothing but
a monotonous extension." M. Cathleen Kaveny, Billable Hours in Ordinary Time: A
Theological Critique of the Instrumentalizationof Time in Professional Life, 33 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 173, 181, 189 (2001).
124 See Greenhouse, supra note 117, at 1640.
125 Reversible both in the sense that the rules of stare decisis can control
outcomes and that past decisions can be overruled. Id. at 1642-43.
126Id. at 1640; see also French, supra note 118, at 709-10 ("[W]ith its ability to
reverse history, the [Supreme Court] itself is viewed as timeless and enduring; it
transcends daily politics in Washington D.C. (or at least tries to) and much of its
mythological magic comes from its perceived elevated and transcendent role in
government.").
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between "profane" and "sacred" time by positing that the latter is
a "primordial mythical time made present" 127 and thus, by its
nature, reversible. Sacred rituals and ceremonies reactualize a
mythic "beginning" which is "indefinitely recoverable, indefinitely
repeatable." 128 The "beginning" is not to be found in a historical
moment because no time can precede the "appearance of the
reality narrated in the myth."'12 9 Transcendent legal time is
"sacred time" for law, creating fissures in the linearity of
ordinary legal time in which a mythic, legal "beginning" is
recalled and reactualized in legal rituals. Its orientation is noninstrumental because it denies the comparative power of any
interest in the context of its own mythology.
To believe in the rule of law is in part to affirm transcendent
legal time, a time apart from the ordinary legal time of individual
interests and the infinite progression of linear, positive law
without beginning or end. When invoked, the rule of law breaks
the continuity of ordinary legal time to recall and reaffirm the
"beginning" of law which precedes states, subjects, and even the
exemplars of law itself.130 The ideals of "restraint of government"
and "the rule of law, not individuals" are thus removed from the
push and pull of ordinary legal time and situated in the realm of
myth. To invoke the rule of law is implicitly to affirm that the
value and permanence of all individual ends, no matter how
worthy, are subordinate to the mythology of the law. Some may
object that this evokes too nearly the classical, metaphysical idea
of the law discredited by the legal realists and their epigones.
But one need not necessarily believe in a "brooding omnipresence
in the sky" or a "heaven of legal concepts" to recognize that
human beings often rely on mythologies, rituals, and other less
than fully rational belief systems to support their essential
commitments. Indeed, the rule of law may not exist outside the
memory of a particular political community:
The divine enters the community through an act of law giving.
Through maintenance of law, the order of the community
becomes a continuing representation of the divine. ... Thus,
127

ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE, supranote 10, at 68.

Id. at 69.
See id. at 72; see also MIRCEA ELIADE, THE MYTH OF THE ETERNAL RETURN
34 (Willard R. Trask trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1954) (1949).
130 See KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW, supra note 122, at 49 ("Thus, the
American conception of law's rule always locates the origin of law in acts beyond
law.").
128

129
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following the law links the present moment back to a divine
Every legal decision ultimately traces its
beginning ....
authority back to this appearance of the sacred. 131

The rule of law, then, appears to the political community as a
break in the linearity of ordinary legal time 13 2 to reaffirm the
extraordinary origin.
The two temporal legal orders are not closed systems
because some features of law are situated in both. The doctrine
of stare decisis, for example, exists in both ordinary and
transcendent legal time. As a feature of ordinary legal time, its
concrete components-precedents-are

part of the substantive

legal rules within which the achievement of interests is
structured and realized. Litigants are attentive to precedent in
order to make their claims more persuasive; courts use it as a
means of organizing and legitimating their rulings. To the
extent that formal legality guides the instrumental deployment
of precedent, therefore, it exists in ordinary legal time. 133 Stare
decisis, however, also exists in transcendent legal time.
Professor Larry Solum rightly points out that a court "binds itself
to the rule of law" in part by adopting a rigorous approach
toward precedent and by submitting to the austere discipline of
precedential constraint. 134 This formalist, totalizing approach to
stare decisis, "a practice to apply to [the] whole domain" 135 of law,
achieves its power by systematically disavowing the supremacy
of legal instrumentalism in favor of the treasury of past

131 Id. at 46-47. Interestingly, Professor Kahn sees only a single order of legal
time and argues that the intervention of the "sacred" "carries forward a
representation of the origins, but only a representation." Id. at 47. Kahn therefore
does not believe that the law's time, even in this manifestation, is cyclical but
instead carries law forward incrementally in its "unique temporal progression"
toward an end "already imagined" by the sacred origin. Id.
132 Eliade refers to these moments of the "irruption" of the sacred into the
profane plane as "hierophanies," manifestations of a sacred reality that "does not
belong to our world." See ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE, supra note 10, at
11.
133 Hence my claim that belief in the rule of law only in part reflects belief in
transcendent legal time.
134 See Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage, supra note 4, at 208. Although
stare decisis is the most demanding form of this self-imposed constraint, the general
idea that precedents should guide decisions "by analogy and distinction" pervades all
of adjudication. See, e.g., Philip C. Kissam, Triangulating Constitutional Theory:
Power, Time, and Everyman, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 269, 288 (2005).
135 See Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage, supra note 4, at 181.
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judgment. 136 But while the rule of law is cyclical, it does not cycle
back to previous precedents (much as, on Eliade's account, sacred
time does not cycle back to previous rituals) so much as it cycles
to the mythical time before the existence of the first precedent.
Each time that a court binds itself to an earlier precedent, it is
affirming not the value of that precedent, but the mythology of
the rule of law. 137
C. Faith in the Rule of Law
We now have a picture of the rule of law that depends
importantly, but only partially, on "reason" and belief in which
depends primarily, but not entirely, on a corresponding belief in
"transcendent legal time." These qualities suggest, I will argue,
that the kind of belief referenced so often by Professor Tamanaha
as necessary to sustain the rule of law is "faith." Once belief in
the rule of law is understood as faith, we can better contextualize
Tamanaha's
description of the ways in which legal
instrumentalism corrodes the rule of law and his claim that our
growing inability to believe in the rule of law is somehow
important irrespective of the truth or falsity of the belief. The
idea that faith is a component of commitment to the law has been
explored by Sanford Levinson,1 38 Paul Carrington, 39 Steven
Smith,1 40 and a few others.1 4 1 Duncan Kennedy has described
136 Brian Tamanaha has pointed out to me that if the two temporal legal orders
are not closed systems, then the rise of legal instrumentalism that he documents in
Law as a Means to an End (whose power shows no signs of abating) will have
significant, and likely deleterious, consequences for the continuing vitality of
transcendent legal time. See E-mail from Brian Tamanaha to Marc DeGirolami (Feb.
23, 2007) (on file with author). I agree with him. As our understanding of law
becomes more linear and instrumental, our very capacity to believe in the cyclical
quality of transcendent legal time will diminish.
137The doctrine of retroactivity also exists in both ordinary and transcendent
legal time. Binding a litigant to a decision that issues well after his legal interest
arose clearly affects his ability to achieve the interest; but the justification for
retroactivity depends upon a belief that law exists beyond, or outside of, ordinary
legal time. See STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 95-96 (2004) [hereinafter

SMITH, LAW'S QUANDRY].
138 SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 15 (1988).
139 Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 226 (1984).
140 Steven D. Smith, Believing like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041, 1100-35

(1999) [hereinafter Smith, Believing like a Lawyer].
141 See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 4 (1960) ("[T]he man at the bar must have confidence on pain of feeling his
own sustaining faith in his craft, in his craftsmanship, in his very office and utility
as a lawyer .... ooze and seep away from him until he stands naked and hollow,

20081

FAITH IN THE RULE OF LAW

contemporary commitment to the rule of law as a "bad faith"-a
psychologically assuaging "fairy tale" that many wish were true
but whose ultimate effect is to perpetuate ideological or political
structures. 142 But there is little discussion of what "faith" means
in this context-that is, how faith's specific features relate to
belief in the rule of law.
The philosopher Timothy Macklem offers this account of
faith:
[T]he concept of faith describes the manner in which a
particular belief or set of beliefs may be subscribed to by human
beings. In that sense of the word, faith exists as a form of rival
to reason. When we say... that we have faith in certain
beliefs, we express a commitment to that which cannot be
established by reason, or to that which can be established by
reason, but not for that reason .... [F]aith treats itself as a
with belief, without
reason to believe, and to act in accordance
143
submitting to the conditions of reason.
Faith offers a reason for belief when one does not know
whether belief is rationally justified. 144 More than this, however,
faith is belief despite the possibility of the lack of any good reason
for belief-that is, belief not only when reasons for belief are
unknown, but potentially unknowable. It is belief "despite the
presence of good reasons not to believe."'145 Macklem's contrast
between "trust" and "faith" is revealing. "Trust" is a mode of
belief that depends ultimately on reasons. A person who trusts
in something-usually, but not always, in something concrete
such as the safety of a bridge or the reliability of an alarm
clock-suspends temporarily, but not indefinitely, the reliance on
reasons for trust. 146 Faith, by contrast, not only does not depend

helpless and worthless, a nithing .... ); Jessie Allen, Blind Faith and Reasonable
Doubts: InvestigatingBelief in the Rule of Law, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 691 (2001).
142 See KENNEDY, supra note 66, at 191-200.
143 TIMOTHY MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND 133-34 (2006). Professor
Macklem observes that the "rivalry between the two concepts is real, but not
complete," because the consequences of belief according to either mode may be the
same. Id. at 133; see also JAMES, The Varieties of Religious Experience, supra note 1,
at 95 (discussing the comparative power of belief and knowledge and stating that the
"inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief is just as manifest when
rationalism argues for religion as when it argues against it.").
144 See J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1721 (1997).
145 MACKLEM, supra note 143, at 136.
146 See id. at 135.
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on the existence or non-existence of reasons but is its own source
of explanation for action: "Hence the phrase 'act of faith,' is used
to describe acts where the agent has little or no conventional
reason to anticipate success and which are not done for the
147
reason that one calculated that one will succeed."'
This is, of course, a contestable interpretation of "faith," but
it is unnecessary to defend it here against the immense catalogue
of other formulations. 148
Rather, the point is that the
Macklemian account of faith sheds light on the type of belief that
Tamanaha implies sustains the rule of law. Belief in the rule of
law depends on the recognition that reason, while always useful,
is at times insufficiently powerful to ground commitment to the
rule of law. In such cases, belief in the rule of law consists in a
kind of self-abnegation or humble affirmation that the
framework within which reason and ordinary legal time have
meaning is limited and contingent. Whether the rule of law
ideals are, in their vast conceptual and applicational complexity,
"true" or "correct" is practically unknowable, so that to believe in
the rule of law is to accept that the underlying foundation for and
value of the belief may always remain obscure and (essentially)
contestable. Or, more hopefully, the benefits of belief in the rule
of law may only reveal themselves in ways which it was
impossible to predict, reason to, or plan for in advance of the
commitment itself. It is in sum the type of belief that James
described as "the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue
149
of which is not certified to us in advance."
147 PETER OLIVER, SIONAIDH DOUGLAS SCOTT, & VICTOR TADROS, FAITH IN LAW:

ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 4 (2000). Macklem recognizes that "faith" and "trust" are
sometimes used interchangeably in ordinary linguistic usage ("In God we trust," "to
have faith in oneself," etc.) so that the contrast between the two is imperfect as a
matter of convention. MACKLEM, supra note 143, at 134-35. Nevertheless, the
distinction is real enough, for while it would be unintelligible to say that one has
"trust" in one's bank if one acknowledged that there was absolutely no reason for it,
it is perfectly intelligible to say that one has faith in the existence of God. Id.
148 Faith, of course, is often a crucial element of various religious traditions, but
the conception of faith discussed here is not derived from any particular religious
tradition. Indeed, I have deliberately chosen what I take to be a highly secular
conception of faith and think it would be fair to say that many religious traditions
would reject this description of faith. See Smith, Believing like a Lawyer, supra note
140, at 1109, for a different conception of legal faith and its relationship to reason
(but not "rationalism").
149

WILLIAM JAMES, The Sentiment of Rationality, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND

OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN IMMORTALITY 63, 90 (Dover ed.
1956) (1897).
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This account of faith and its connection to the rule of law
brings into alignment many of Tamanaha's claims about the
corrosive effects of legal instrumentalism on the rule of law.
First, it explains Tamanaha's repeated but perhaps insufficiently
developed insistence on the value of "pervasive belief' tout
court.150 The question of a beliefs truth or falsity necessarily
implicates the search for and vindication of reasons. Belief when
reasons are unavailable seems to be just what Tamanaha has in
mind when he writes that "[t]he fact of this belief [in noninstrumental ideas of the law] turned out to have greater
significance than its falsity." 15 1 Of Lochnerian "formalist" judges,
for example, Tamanaha writes:
Whereas the conventional wisdom today ... is that formalist
judges intentionally favored capital interests, a strong case can
be made that in their own minds they were doing the
opposite ....
Formalist judges saw themselves as heroically staving off the
integrity of the law posed by
threat to the non-instrumental
152
special interest legislation.
The instrumental threat to the rule of law, therefore, "is not
that it is impossible for judges to be consciously rule-bound when
rendering their decisions .... Rather the threat comes from the
belief that it cannot be done or the choice not to do it."153 The
value of faith in the rule of law, then, might be, as Professor Scott
Altman has argued, that "law becomes more or less constraining
depending on individual judges' beliefs about law, judges' role
conceptions, and expectations about law held by observers in
Belief in law is thus somewhat
various positions of power ....

See TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 119.
TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note *, at 19; see also id. at
35 ("To see law as an instrument entails perceiving and describing its nature in
instrumental terms .... The common law.., was not perceived to be instrumental
150

151

in nature in the centuries' long primacy of non-instrumental view[s] of law that
continued throughout the nineteenth century." (emphasis added)); id. at 142-43
("Lawyers of the past... consistently claimed to aspire to both ideals-service to the
client and service to the public good.").
152 Id. at 49, 51. "Some will say that Supreme Courts have always engaged in
instrumental manipulation of the law for ideological purposes, though they may
have better concealed it. Perhaps, but a distinction exists between thinking that a
practice is inappropriate, so it must be resisted or concealed, versus thinking that it
is acceptable." Id. at 95.
153 Id. at 244.
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self-fulfilling." 154 In fact, Tamanaha has been interpreted in just
this way by Professor Adrian Vermeule, who calls this view
"esoteric legalism." 155 But I believe that Tamanaha may have in
mind something other than a secularized version of Pascal's
wager, and in the next section, I briefly explore a different value.
Second, to pinpoint faith as the type of belief that Tamanaha
describes is to understand why he is so ambivalent on the merits
of legal instrumentalism. He seems all-in-all persuaded that
non-instrumental theories are untrue, unreal, and unreasonable:
"I do not vouch for the veracity of claims that law embodied
principle, reason, and the customs and order of the
community." 156 It is difficult to dispute that instrumentalism
brought a clear-eyed and honest appraisal of law that exposed
the "enforced homogeneity" and hypocrisy of non-instrumental
theories.1 57 In short, if faith in the rule of law is valuable, then
its value does not derive, in Tamanaha's view, from the
reasonableness of its claims, but from other and quite different
sources-the "nourishing, enriching, [and] containing"1 58 force of
the three ideals or the "foundational source of grounding,
159
content, and limits on the law."
Finally, once Tamanaha's critique of legal instrumentalism
is understood to be not as much about substance as about the
ways in which we perceive or believe in the rule of law, then his
regret over the loss of belief becomes comprehensible. In the
154 Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 303-04 (1990). Altman
explains that "[b]y 'partially self-fulfilling,' I mean something that is false, but that
becomes closer to being true because people believe it." Id. at 303.
155 See Adrian Vermeule, Instrumentalisms, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2113, 2125-30
(2007) (book review). Professor Vermeule writes:
[T]he basic prescription of [Law as a Means to an End] is that judges and
officials should all believe that they can and should abide by the law in
good faith .... How are beliefs like these to be generated, where they do

not already exist? A belief that law is non-instrumental ...

cannot be

willed into being for the sake of its beneficial effects; it can only arise as a
byproduct of evidence or argument.
Id. at 2130.
To my mind, this has it exactly backwards. Belief that law is non-instrumental
cannot be the byproduct but must be the core of the commitment to the rule of law.
"Argument" and "evidence" may reinforce that belief (or not), but without the belief,
argument and evidence are frequently ineffectual. See JAMES, The Varieties of
Religious Experience, supra note 1, at 95-96.
156 TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note *, at 246.
157 See id.
158 Id. at 249.
159 Id. at 215.
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normal course, after all, it would be signally bizarre for someone
to bemoan the loss of belief in "patently implausible" ideas. If
one assumes, however, that belief in the rule of law sometimes
cannot be sustained by reason alone, and that what can sustain
it when reason "runs out" is faith, then one may have good
reason to lament the loss of that faith. This insight-that we are
steadily losing the capacity to have faith in the rule of law and
that loss of faith is the essential danger posed by legal
instrumentalism-is Tamanaha's crucial claim.
But is he right? Certainly, Tamanaha makes a strong case
by highlighting several prominent and particularly controversial
contemporary examples. 160 And it hardly need be said that
academic theorizing about the rule of law has been profoundly
affected by the instrumentalist turn. 16 1 Still, for all of the wellworn predictions beginning over a century ago that law would
inevitably, and rightly, evolve into instrumentalist debates about
public policy, moral philosophy, economics, or some other social
or political science, some argue that most people continue right
along believing in the rule of law more or less as they ever
have. 162 Thus, one occasionally wonders whether all of this is the
legal theoretician's tempest in a teapot, a reflection of her
concern to ground commitment to the rule of law in something
that appears firmer, more concrete, and more reasonable than
faith. 163 Those efforts are, of course, worthwhile because certain
manifestations of the rule of law are dependent on reason and do
operate within ordinary legal time. In fact, the "price" of faith in
the rule of law is precisely that it blinds the faithful to the extent
164
to which reasons and interests shape their commitments.
Doubt, then, is crucial for maintaining a vital faith because doubt
perpetually tests it against the world of instrumental demands.
165
No one stands outside of that world.
160 See TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, supra note *, at 147-211.
161 See id. at 118-32; see also Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage, supra note

4, at 165-66.
162 See SMITH, LAW'S QUANDRY, supra note 137, at 157, 175.

Steven Smith suggests that even academics may believe in the rule of law in
a more metaphysically robust way than they let on in their explicit theorizing about
the law. Id. at 164-65.
164 See MACKLEM, supra note 143, at 140-41.
165 See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Religion and the World, in RELIGION, POLITICS
AND THE MORAL LIFE 27, 31 (Timothy Fuller ed., 1993).
The worldly man, as I picture him, believes in the fundamental stability of
the present order, or that it will merely evolve into another .... This belief
163
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III. THE WAGES OF FAITH
Even if Professor Tamanaha's warnings about the
deleterious effects of legal instrumentalism reflect a tacit
acknowledgment of the need for faith in the rule of law, we are
still left with a nagging, "So what?" Why should we continue to
have faith in the rule of law? Isn't it better to let the faith die off
or even speed along its demise? Here is the sketch of a response
that would require a separate essay to develop adequately.
The value of faith in Macklem's account is that it enables
commitment when one cannot know beforehand whether
commitment would be worthwhile. This is not merely a problem
about lack of sufficient information: "Rather, it is a question of
activities the value of which derives in part from the very fact of
commitment to that activity, so that the value of the activity is
unknowable in advance of commitment to the activity."166 Faith
in the rule of law enables us to affirm certain contestable
commitments-formal legality, government restraint, "the rule of
law, not individuals," and likely others-which contribute to
human well-being without needing to independently premeditate
and explain how those commitments advance our interests in
ordinary legal time.167 "A social organism of any sort whatever,
large or small," writes James,
is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty
with a trust that the other members will simulataneously do
theirs. Wherever a desired result is achieved by the cooperation of many independent persons, its existence as a fact is
a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of
those immediately concerned. 168
To say anything more is difficult because faith's value cannot
be known or reasoned to before commitment; or, more precisely,
implies what may be described as an external standard of value: things are
imagined to have some worth apart from their value in the life of an
individual; and consequently, what is prized is success, meaning the

achievement of some external result....
These beliefs-and there are few of us who are not saturated with themare the world ....Nothing can be certainly free from its influence ....

Id.

MACKLEM, supra note 143, at 138.
"Independently," that is, of making the commitments themselves. For
purposes of the discussion in this section, I bracket the question of the degree to
which rule of law formalism is dependent upon reason.
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WILLIAM JAMES, The Will to Believe, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER

ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY, supra note 149, at 1, 24.
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part of the value of faith inheres in the commitment itself. Still,
one might posit that whatever the value of faith in the rule of law
may be, it is not an instrumental interest achievable in ordinary
legal time. 169 Perhaps it is the value in believing that the dread
of mortality, the paradigmatic feature of linear time, can be
fleetingly abated by an ineffable commitment to the law. 170 If
this sounds too grand and presumptuous for an activity-rulefollowing-that usually appears altogether ordinary, I can only
offer in response that the sentiment of mortality is (pace
Lucretius1 71 ) never eased. Ineffable beliefs of this kind probably
would seem foolish or irrational to anyone wedded to an
exclusively instrumentalist mode of thought. And indeed, faith
in the rule of law may, in the end, be merely one more delusion
among many that await the disenchantment of oblivion. But far
from an exercise in arrogance, it is inspired by an expansive
humility-even a pessimism-about law's instrumental capacity
to meliorate the human condition, and a persistent mindfulness
of the limits of human power. As delusions go, one could surely
do worse.

169 The intrinsic non-instrumentalism of the rule of law is discussed in MICHAEL
OAKESHOTT, The Rule of Law, in ON HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 129 (Liberty Fund
1999) (1983).
170 See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 162-63 (1975)

("If one described the sentiment of mortality as the premonition of the finality of
death and the sentiment of society as the experience of the preeminence of social
rules and roles over individual desires and values, then one might say that the
sentiment of mortality is fuel to the sentiment of society.").
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See his famously upbeat account in LUCRETIUS, DE RERUM NATURA bk. 3

(W.H.D. Rouse trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1975).
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